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NSC BRIEFING

5 August 1954

POSSIBLE CHINESE ATTACKS ON OFFSHORE ISLANDS

- I. Strong possibility of Chinese Communist operations against some Nationalist-held offshore islands during next several weeks.
 - A. Since 9 July, Peiping has claimed US intention extend 7th Fleet coverage to "certain" off-shore islands.
 - B. Communists may want to move before US committed to defense as well as before start monsoon season (late September-October).
 - C. Most vulnerable Nationalist islands are Tachen and Matsu groups.
- II. Since mid-May, Communists have occupied six small islands some 20 miles north of Tachens.
 - A. Nationalists now report arrival six landing craft, with 10,000 troops, at point 50 miles north of Tachens, also sighting of 1,000-ton warship, many small vessels at points 15 miles east and southeast of Tachens.

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- IV. Nationalist strength believed to be only 15,000 troops on Tachens, 9,000 on Matsus, possibly 4,500 on Nanchi.
 - A. These islands valuable to Nationalists as listening posts, for advance warning air and sea attacks on Formosa, and as bases for operation against mainland.
 - V. In addition to strong chance attack on Nationalist islands, also marginal possibility attack on Formosa.
 - A. Current propaganda most intense, aggressive since 1950.
 - B. Principal charges: US scheming use Formosa as base for aggression; advising, assisting Chinese Nationalist forces; dispatching spies and saboteurs to mainland; committing piracy against merchant vessels.
 - C. Peiping also asserts US preparing conclude pact with Taipei which would show "permanent hostility" to Chinese people, with "protracted grave consequences."

- D. Since 26 July, Peiping has said Chinese peoples "most important task" is "liberation" of Formosa. On l August (Army Day) Commander in Chief Chu Teh said Chinese must fight with "singleness of purpose" to take Formosa, that "other countries" will not be allowed to interfere.
- VI. At least four reasons for Peiping propaganda on Formosa now.
 - A. With Korean stalemate, armistice in Indo-China, logical device for keeping Chinese worked up is Formosa, which Communists have been vowing to "liberate" since 1949.
 - B. Nationalist seizures Bloc ships is cause.

 for serious concern.
 - C. Communists genuinely want no US-Chiang pact, which would increase US commitment to defense Formosa.
 - D. Formosa is ideal issue for widening differences between US and rest of West, US and Asian "neutrals."



- VII. Full-scale assault on Formosa in near future unlikely.
 - A. Peiping made same assertion in 1950 about fighting "single-mindedly" for Formosa, but in fact Communists have not moved against the island.
 - B. Peiping's main consideration was and still is US commitment to island's defense, as symbolized by mission of US 7th Fleet.
 - C. However, Communists have capability for air attack Formosa. May do this at any time, to give substance to propaganda.

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